"A New Approach to Nuclear Warhead Verification Using a Zero-Knowledge Protocol", Dr. Alexander Glaser, Princeton University

Warhead verification systems proposed to date fundamentally rely on the use of informa- tion barriers to prevent the release of classified design information. Measurements with information barriers significantly increase the complexity of inspection systems, make their certification and authentication difficult, and may reduce the overall confidence in the verifi- ability of future arms-control agreements. This talk presents a proof-of-concept of a new approach to nuclear warhead verification that minimizes the role of information barriers from the outset and envisions instead an inspection system that a priori avoids leakage of sensitive information using a so-called zero-knowledge protocol. The proposed inspection system is based on the template-matching approach and relies on active interrogation of a test object with 14-MeV neutrons. The viability of the method is examined with MCNP Monte Carlo neutron transport calculations modeling the experimental setup, an investiga- tion of different diversion scenarios, and an analysis of the simulated data showing that it does not contain information about the properties of the inspected object.